Cutting Edge

Chapter 4
Birth of Science

The scientific era of Fort Detrick began in 1943. Gone were the aircraft from Detrick Field. In their stead came men new to uniforms, but skilled in their craft. Their purpose in March 1943 was twofold: in broad terms, they were to develop defensive mechanisms against biological attack; and they were to develop weapons, with which the United States could respond "in kind" if attacked by an enemy, which deployed biological weapons.

This was an enormous task [wrote Lieutenant Colonel Richard M. Clendenin in his booklet SCIENCE and TECHNOLOGY at Fort Detrick, 1943-1968] . . . it was literally without precedent and had to be prosecuted with all possible haste.

The mounting threat of the German "buzz bombs" that were raining on England from launching sites on the Continent during 1943 spurred the urgency of BW (biological warfare) defense because it was thought that these high-explosive rockets might easily be converted into efficient weapons for massive BW attacks.

From the moment of its birth in the highest levels of government, the fledgling biological warfare effort was kept to an inner circle of knowledgeable persons. George W. Merck was a key member of the panel advising President Franklin D. Roosevelt and was charged with putting such an effort together. Merck owned the pharmaceutical firm that still bears his name.

Merck brought into uniform men and women with skills in several scientific disciplines. Among them was Dr. Ira L. Baldwin, professor of bacteriology at the University of Wisconsin. He became the first scientific director.

The Army Chemical Warfare Service was given responsibility and oversight for the effort that Clendenin wrote was "cloaked in the deepest wartime secrecy, matched only by . . . the Manhattan Project for developing the Atomic Bomb."

Reasons for the stringent security were twofold [Clendenin continued], not only to prevent the enemy from learning that work was being done in BW, but also to keep the public and even the Armed Forces themselves from becoming unduly alarmed over the possibility of BW. The elaborate security precautions taken were so effective that it was not until January 1946, 4 months after VJ (Victory in Japan) Day, that the public learned of the wartime research in BW (at Fort Detrick).

The BW research effort was launched in the fall of 1941 when Secretary of War Henry Stimson wrote to Dr. Frank B. Jewett, then president of the National Academy of Sciences:

Because of the dangers that might confront this country from potential enemies employing what may be broadly described as biological warfare, it seems advisable that investigations be initiated to survey the present situation and the future possibilities. I am therefore, asking if you will undertake the appointment of an appropriate committee to survey all phases of this matter. Your organization already has before it a request from The Surgeon General for the appointment of a committee by the Division of Medical Sciences of the National Research Council to examine one phase of the matter. I trust that appropriate integration of these efforts can be arranged.

In his historical narrative, Clendenin wrote:

At the request of Dr. Jewett, Dr. Edwin B. Fred, professor of bacteriology, University of Wisconsin, gathered together a working group to make the study requested by the Secretary of War.

Known as the WBC Committee (War Bureau of Consultants) the group comprised 12 nationally prominent scientists plus representatives of the U.S. Army Chemical Warfare Service, the U.S. Army Ordnance Corps, the U.S. Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, the U.S. Army Surgeon's General Office, the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Public Health Service. The committee was to do its work in utmost secrecy.

Secretary Stimson understood that intelligence reports clearly stated both Germany and Japan had a BW capability. He also knew of Germany's BW attack on the Rumanian Cavalry using glanders disease, and that German saboteurs introduced the disease into the United States among horses and mules being shipped to Europe in World War I.

Secretary Stimson wrote in February 1942:

The value of biological warfare will be a debatable question until it has been clearly proven or disproved by experiences. The wide assumption is that any method which appears to offer advantages to a nation at war will be vigorously employed by that nation. There is but one logical course to pursue, namely, to study the possibilities of such warfare from every angle, make every preparation for reducing its effectiveness, and thereby reduce the likelihood of its use.

In May 1942, President Roosevelt authorized Secretary Stimson to establish a civilian agency to take the lead on all aspects of BW. It was assigned to the Federal Security Agency (FSA) to obscure its existence and Merck was named director of the new War Research Service (WRS).

It became clear to the WRS and Merck that the initial phase of work with universities and private research institutions was inadequate to meet the need. Large scale efforts above what could be done in scattered centers was an obvious need. The use of biological agents in weapons and concurrent need to develop means of protection against these BW weapons prompted Merck to assign overall responsibility to the Army's Chemical Warfare Service.

Dr. Baldwin's assignment soon followed and he headed an intensive 4 months of planning and recommended Detrick Field as a location for the new BW laboratories. He also surrounded himself with scientists, who represented America's brain trust in their field. He had a priority on funds and personnel, sending out the call for officers and enlisted men in numerous scientific and professional fields.

Dr. Baldwin chose Detrick Field for the site of this exhaustive research effort because of its reasonably remote location and proximity to Washington, DC, as well as Edgewood Arsenal, focal point of U.S. chemical warfare research. Buildings and other facilities left from the airfield-including the large hanger-provided the nucleus of support needed at the beginning. The 92 acres of Detrick Field were surrounded by farmland that could be procured if and when the effort was expanded.

Detrick Field was formally acquired on March 9, 1943. A small cadre of men arrived to begin the conversion process. Lieutenant Colonel William S. Bacon, the first commander, and his successor, Colonel Martin B. Chittick, oversaw the renovation and construction first estimated to cost $1.25 million.

Clendenin wrote:

Three months after the start of construction, the estimate was raised to more than $4 million to provide for five additional laboratories and a pilot plant.

Bacon was authorized 85 officers, 373 enlisted personnel, and 80 enlisted Women's Army Auxiliary Corp (WAAC) members under two WAAC officers. At its peak strength in 1945, Camp Detrick had 240 officers and 1,530 enlisted personnel including WAACs. Alex Bryant was a newly married boilermaker living in Petersburg, Virginia, when he was drafted. He underwent basic training at Camp Lee, Virginia, and immediately was put on a train for "destination unknown."

Bryant said in an interview:

All I know is I arrived in Frederick and had no idea where I was going. I was taken to Camp Detrick. There wasn't much to see, but I started right in putting in one of the boilers and operating it.

Dr. Baldwin's task was far-reaching. Science in 1943 was still founded on workbench investigation. Containment of an organism to its own environment was mostly an idea. Overcoming this barrier had to be accomplished before any genuine progress could be made working with highly infectious organisms. The rest of the scientific world had not really tackled the issue, choosing instead to concentrate its efforts on gaining medical knowledge in spite of danger to laboratory staff.

The Japanese, as the U.S. learned at the end of World War II, had been making significant progress learning about traditional BW agents that cause diseases like botulism and anthrax. Their work was in open air testing on prisoners and at their workbenches of the officially named "Water Purification Unit 731" near Harbin, a remote, desolate area on the Manchurian Peninsula.

Fort Detrick sent several investigators to Japan after the war to interrogate captured Japanese scientists. Leading the team was Dr. Norbert Fell and Lieutenant Colonel Arvo Thompson. Working with General Douglas MacArthur's intelligence team at Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), Dr. Fell and Thompson learned the full extent of the Japanese program headed by Lieutenant General Shiro Ishii. In the European Theater, Nazi Germany had put its effort into chemical research. It also used thousands of Jewish inmates in the concentration camps for grisly surgical and medical research. Nazi Germany is said to have had a mortal fear of the U.S. BW capability and decided against BW shortly after America entered the war in 1942.

The U.S. biological warfare effort became a top priority program. Dr. Baldwin's task was not easy. Clendenin wrote:

...basic measures first had to be developed for the protection of Camp Detrick personnel who would be working with highly infectious microorganisms in the laboratories and pilot plants.

Biological, chemical, and mechanical means of protection were studied. Vaccines, toxoids, antibiotics, disinfectants, and antiseptics were evaluated. Techniques were devised for detecting, sampling, and identifying a great variety of pathogens and their toxic products. Decontamination and sterilization procedures evolved.

Laboratory workers, scientists, civilian employees, and military members were treated in the old Fort Detrick hospital (Building 660). The long wooden corridors are gone from the facility, which was built in September 1944 at a cost of $263,221. It has served as a bachelor officers quarters for more than 20 years.

A Medical Corps complement served in the hospital to provide medical care for assigned personnel. Dr. Paul N. Hudson served as liaison between the Surgeon General of the Army and the BW program. Civilian medical support was an integral part of the entire Fort Detrick complex in the early 1950s with Dr. Paul J. Kadull in charge of immunization and medical support. Chief Nurse was Betty Grable, whose name caught the ear of soldiers wondering if the great World War II Pinup Girl had joined the WAAC. Dr. Arnold G. Wedum was in charge of all safety matters.

Lieutenant Colonel Abram S. Benenson was appointed medical liaison officer in 1955. Soon after, the decision was made to create the U.S. Army Medical Unit (USAMU). Benenson became deputy to the first commander of USAMU, Colonel William D. Tigertt (MC).

Dr. Newell A. Johnson, now a physician in California, was one of the first three Army officers assigned to the new laboratories in mid-March 1943. He was responsible for designing modifications to the hangar and other safety equipment when the facility was being set up. Dr. Johnson's design work was preliminary and done in consultation with Dr. Baldwin, Dr. Gail Dack, and Dr. Oram C. Woolpert.

"The scientists would come to me," Johnson related, "and tell me what they needed and I would draw up an idea. The engineers would then complete the design work and get it constructed."

Such items as Class III research cabinets and Laminar Flow Hoods were among the items designed by the staff and remain basically the same today. Space-age materials are now used on glove ports, and sealant and pastel paints have replaced the dull steel external surfaces. Some of the early models are still in use but are being replaced.

The first prototype Class III cabinet was fashioned in 1943 by Hubert Kaempf, then a soldier. He had been a new military policeman (MP) at Pine Bluff, Arkansas, when he was put on orders for reassignment. "All I know is they put me on a train. We went to York, Pennsylvania, where a bus met us and took us to Camp Detrick. There I saw all the other soldiers, who had disappeared from Pine Bluff."

Kaempf said he tired of his MP duties and was able to transfer to the sheet metal department working with the contractor. He was taught "everything I needed to know" by workmen from the H.K. Ferguson Co.

"We used to work from hand drawings," Kaempf said. "Dr. Wedum would come in and say he thought of something overnight that was needed and we would kind of draw it up and then make it."

Kaempf retired from Fort Detrick in 1994, having completed more than 50 years service. He was chief of the mechanical branch, Directorate of Engineering and Housing.

A sweep of Frederick by the Federal Bureau of Investigation during World War II resulted in a report that noted security was indeed adequate and effective at Camp Detrick. It added, ". . . either the people of Frederick really did not know or they were not at all curious" about what was going on at Camp Detrick.

One early scientist pointed out the residents depended on Camp Detrick and made every effort not to cause any problems. "It was pretty obvious that we were doing scientific work because of all the laboratory equipment we procured locally," he said.

The enduring legacy of such men as Dr. Wedum, Dr. Baldwin, and indeed, Hubert Kaempf and his contemporaries is the foundation of Fort Detrick and a key element in the continued expansion of Fort Detrick's scientific and technological achievements over the past 50 years.

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